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CRIMINAL LAW-THE MEANING OF VIOLENCE: AN INTERPRE
TIVE ANALYSIS ON WHETHER A PRIOR CONVICTION FOR CARRY
ING A CONCEALED WEAPON IS A "CRIME OF VIOLENCE" UNDER
THE UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES

INTRODucnON

In United States v. Price, the defendant Price pleaded guilty to

the crime of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of
federallaw. 1 During sentencing, the court considered Price's prior
Florida conviction of carrying a concealed weapon a "crime of vio
lence" under the United States Sentencing Guidelines (Guide
lines).2 This resulted in an enhancement of Price's sentence, from
twelve to eighteen months,3 to a thirty-month sentence. 4 On ap
peal, Price argued that his prior conviction for carrying a concealed
weapon under Florida law was improperly characterized as a crime
of violence, and thus, his sentence was incorrect. s Relying on its
own precedent, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit af
firmed the trial judge's sentence. 6 Therefore, the judge's determi
nation that Price's prior conviction of carrying a concealed weapon
was a crime of violence directly and substantially impacted the sen
tence that Price received. Currently the courts of appeals disagree
as to whether a prior conviction for carrying a concealed weapon is
a crime of violence under the Guidelines.? This split among the
federal courts of appeals concerning the proper classification (vio
1. United States v. Price, 132 F. App'x 341 (11th Cir. 2005). Price was convicted
under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922 (g)(l) and 924(a)(2). [d.
2. [d. at 342.
3. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, § 5A, at 377 (2005). Price's base
level would have been set at fourteen pursuant to section 2K2.1(a)(6), which provides
for a base level of fourteen if the defendant was a "prohibited person at the time the
defendant committed the instant offense." [d. § 2K2.1(a)(6). "[A] prohibited person
[is] any person described in 18 U.S.c. § 922(g) ...." [d. § 2K2.1, cmt., n.3. Price would
have likewise received a reduction of three points for "accept[ing] responsibility," set
ting his final base level offense at eleven. See id. §§ 3El.1(a)-(b).
4. Price received a three-level reduction as a result of accepting responsibility
pursuant to the U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 3, §§ 3E1.1(a)-(b),
therefore his sentencing base level offense was seventeen. Price, 132 F. App'x at 342.
5. Price, 132 F. App'x at 341.
6. [d. at 343.
7. See infra Part I.F.
801
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lent or non-violent) of a concealed weapons conviction has created
a disparity in our federal criminal justice system. s
This Note is written with the purpose of resolving the disparity
between the circuit courts' interpretations of the crime of violence
provision under the Guidelines and whether a prior conviction for
carrying a concealed weapon is included within its scope. Part I will
discuss the origin and operation of the Guidelines. This Part will
also analyze the crime of carrying a concealed weapon by compar
ing the various state laws governing the crime. Furthermore, this
Part will examine the current case law, analyzing the split among
the circuit courts over the issue of whether a prior conviction for
carrying a concealed weapon is a crime of violence.
In Part II, this Note will argue several points that aid in ob
taining the proper scope of the crime of violence provision, and will
ultimately find that it does not include the crime of carrying a con
cealed weapon. First, under a common canon of statutory interpre
tation, the crime of carrying a concealed weapon is excluded from
the scope of the crime of violence provision. Also, while the courts
of appeals have diverged in their conclusions on this issue, they
have all taken the same insufficient approach in the analysis of the
provision. Therefore, this Note will set forth a new approach to
analyzing the crime of violence provision-an objective categorical
approach.9 By applying this approach, Part II will provide further
reasoning and support as to why the crime of carrying a concealed
weapon is not a crime of violence.
I.

A.

BACKGROUND

Criminal Sentencing in the United States: A Brief Analysis of
the Evolution of the Criminal Sentencing Structure

Historically, the United States has implemented various sys
tems of criminal punishment. While the roles of the three branches
of government have been in a constant evolution with respect to
sentencing, they have always mirrored, in some form, the general
theory of "separation of powers."lO No one branch has ever had
8. Id.
9. While the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits arrived at differing conclusions about
whether a concealed weapons conviction is a "crime of violence," both did so by a
"subjective" evaluation of the risk created by the conduct. For further discussion, see
infra Part ILB.
10. The United States sought to apply the theory of separation of powers to crim
inal sentencing. By separating powers among the branches of the government, with
each branch having equal power and separate duties, separation of power ensures a
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overriding authority, or rather, exercised overriding authority in the
area of sentencing with the exception of the executive branch,
which has the power of the presidential pardon. 11 Instead, criminal
punishment has been the result of the interaction between the three
branches of government. This idea of cooperation between the
branches in sentencing can be traced back even further than the
creation of the federal courts.12 For example, the 1789 Act to regu
late the Collection of Duties provided that if a person swears or
affirms falsely, he or she shall be punished by fine or imprisonment,
"in the discretion of the court before whom the conviction shall be
had, so as the fine shall not exceed one thousand dollars, and the
term of imprisonment shall not exceed twelve months."13 This Act
depicts the three-branch 14 sentencing structure found in the federal
criminal system-that the court has discretionary powers to pre
scribe a particular sentence, as long as that sentence is within the
range provided by Congress, with the presidential pardon existing
in the background. 15
The sharing of power between the branches in the area of sen
tencing evolved further with the creation of the parole system. In
1910, Congress established the first parole system whereby a com
mission would be established in every prison, and would have the
system of checks and balances that best serves a democratic form of government. The
notion of separating the powers to achieve this is best represented by the Federalist No.
51, which declared that
[t]o what expedient, then, shall we finally resort, for maintaining in practice
the necessary partition of power among the several departments, as laid down
in the Constitution? The only answer that can be given is, that as all these
exterior provisions are found to be inadequate, the defect must be supplied, by
so contriving the interior structure of the government as that its several con
stituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each
other in their proper places.
THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison).
11. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (declaring that "[t]he President ... shall have
Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States").
12. Compare An Act to regulate the Collection of the Duties imposed by law on
the tonnage of ships or vessels, and on goods, wares and merchandises imported into
the United States, ch. 5, § 35, 1 Stat. 29, 46-47 (1789) (setting a broad range for sentenc
ing and leaving the court with discretion to impose the proper sentence within that
range) (signed into law on July 31, 1789), with Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73 (passed
two months later on September 24, 1789, which established the federal courts).
13. An Act to regulate the Collection of the Duties imposed by law on the ton
nage of ships or vessels, and on goods, wares and merchandises imported into the
United States, ch. 5, § 35, 1 Stat. 29, 46-47 (1789).
14. Only the Legislature and Judiciary appear explicitly in the statute, however,
the constitutional provision of the presidential pardon is always present.
15. See Ilene H. Nagel, Structuring Sentencing Discretion: The New Federal Sen
tencing Guidelines, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 883, 892 (1990).
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authority to release certain prisoners who the commission believed
were rehabilitated and would "live and remain at liberty without
violating the laws. "16 Under the parole system, immediate discre
tion was divided not only between Congress and the courts, but also
an independent parole board. A defendant's sentence became in
determinate, and he should be incarcerated "until he or she had
reformed."17 The authority was divided between judges and the pa
role board. Judges retained the authority to suspend a defendant's
sentence,18 while the parole board could release a defendant after
one-third of his sentence had been served. 19
After decades of a "parole" sentencing structure that was
largely based on judicial discretion, the political atmosphere con
cerning the punishment of criminals changed in the 1980s.20 Inde
terminate sentencing was producing unsatisfactory results in the
minds of members of Congress. 21 As a result, in 1984, President
Reagan signed the Comprehensive Crime Control Act,22 which
contained several criminal law reforms including the Sentencing
Reform Act. 23 The Sentencing Reform Act established the Sen
tencing Commission that was charged with creating the Guide
lines24 to correct the problems with the existing federal sentencing
system. The roles of the three branches had changed once again
and the authority of the judiciary in sentencing was reduced in or
der to accomplish the goals of Congress.

16. An Act to parole United States prisoners, ch. 387, § 3, 36 Stat. 819,819 (1910)
(repealed 1984).
17. Nagel, supra note 15, at 894.
18. KATE STITH & JOSE A. Cabranes, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDE·
LINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 19 (1998). The Supreme Court in Ex parte United
States, 242 U.S. 27, 51-52 (1916), held that federal courts could not suspend a sentence
if the legislature provided a statutory minimum sentence for the crime. Judicial power
to suspend a sentence was reinstated when Congress enacted the Probation Act of 1925,
ch. 521, § 1, 43 Stat. 1259, 1259.
19. An Act To parole United States prisoners, ch. 387, § 1, 36 Stat. at 819 (codi
fied at 18 U.S.C §§ 4202-4208 (repealed 1984».
20. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 18, at 29-35.
21. See id. at 43-48.
22. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. 2, 98 Stat.
1837, 1976 (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C and 28 U.S.C).
23. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. 2, ch. 2, 98 Stat.
1837,1987 (1984) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C §§ 3551-3673; 28 U.S.C §§ 991-998
(2000».
24. 28 U.S.C § 994.
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The Sentencing Commission 25 was created to establish a suc
cessful system of punishm'ent that operates with the express pur
pose of efficiently, fairly, and realistically punishing a particular
crime. 26 Instead of establishing a singular and primary purpose of
punishment to which all sentences must conform in principle, and
allowing latitude for judicial discretion to impose the correct sen
tence,27 the Guidelines provide an objective valuation of crime and
an objective measure for punishment. Furthermore, the Guidelines
purport to pursue all four of the purposes and principles of punish
ment-deterrence, incapacitation, retribution, and rehabilitation. 28
The Guidelines also effectively reduce the sharing of the responsi
bility of criminal punishment between the branches by instituting a
uniform, mechanical system of punishment. 29 Thus, judicial discre
tion in criminal sentencing has been diminished, essentially chang
ing the balance among the branches. 3D
25.

The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 98 Stat. at 1987 (codified at 18 U.S.c.

§§ 3551-3673 (2000); 28 U.S.c. §§ 991-998 (2000)).

26. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 3, § 1Al.1, editorial
note, at 2, (declaring that "Congress sought proportionality in sentencing through a
system that imposes appropriately different sentences for criminal conduct of different
severity"); see also STITH & CABRANES, supra note 18, at 104 (quoting a letter from the
Honorable Stephen S. Trott, Associate Attorney General, on behalf of the U.S. Depart
ment of Justice to Hon. William Wilkins, Jr., Chairman of the U.S. Sentencing Commis
sion dated April 7, 1987, that read, in part, "Simply stated, unwarranted disparity
caused by broad judicial discretion is the ill that the Sentencing Reform Act seeks to
cure").
27. See generally STITH & CABRANES, supra note 18, at 38-39 (discussing Senator
Edward Kennedy, who proposed versions of Sentence Reform bills beginning in the
1970s, because he viewed "sentencing in the federal courts as 'a disgrace,' 'a national
scandal,' a 'glaring flaw,' in 'utter disarray,' 'hopelessly inconsistent,' 'arbitrary,' and
'desperately' in need of reform").
28. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 3, § 1Al.1, editorial
note, at 2 (declaring that the "guidelines ... will further the basic purposes of criminal
punishment, i.e., deterring crime, incapacitating the offender, providing just punishment
[retributive punishment], and rehabilitating the offender"). "Deterrent punishment" is
defined as "[p]unishment intended to deter the offender and others from committing
crimes and to make an example of the offender so that like-minded people are warned
of the consequences of crime." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1270 (8th ed. 2004). "Inca
pacitation" is defined as the "action of disabling ...." Id. at 775. "Retributive punish
ment" is defined as "[p]unishment intended to satisfy the community's retaliatory sense
of indignation that is provoked by injustice." Id. at 1270. "Rehabilitation" is defined as
"[t]he process of seeking to improve a criminal's character and outlook so that he or she
can function in society without committing other crimes." Id. at 1311.
29. The term "mechanical" refers, in particular, to the Sentencing Table, where
sentences are calculated according to a numerical standard. See infra text accompany
ing notes 35-37.
30. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 18, at 4-5 (noting that the Guidelines
permit the judge to "depart" from the sentence prescribed by the Guidelines in only
two narrow circumstances).
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The Sentencing Guidelines

Congress vested the Sentencing Commission with the power to
create a sentencing system that
provide[s] certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of sen
tencing, avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities among de
fendants with similar records who have been found guilty of
similar criminal conduct while maintaining sufficient flexibility to
permit individualized sentences when warranted by mitigating or
aggravating factors not taken into account in the establishment of
general sentencing practices; and [to] reflect, to the extent practi
cable, advancement in knowledge of human behavior as it relates
to the criminal justice process. 31

Congress directed the Commission to focus on two broad factors
when imposing a sentence: (1) the current offense and the charac
teristics of the defendant 32 and (2) the need for the punishment. 33
The Sentencing Commission, therefore, attempted to create an ob
jective system of determining punishment, and this culminated in
the formation of the Sentencing Table. As a result, the interplay
between the branches of government profoundly changed with both
the abandonment of the parole system and the institution of a sys
tem of punishment that requires sentencing based on a "mechani
cal" calculation by the judge according to the Sentencing Table
rather than on the judge's discretion. 34
The Sentencing Table is a 258-box grid that has six criminal
history categories on the top margin and forty-three offense levels
on the left margin. 35 The Guidelines operate by assigning point val
ues to the two sub-factors to be considered in sentencing-the cur
rent offense and the characteristics of the defendant. The current
offense can be enhanced by adding points that are largely derivative
of the circumstances of the crime committed. For example, if a de
fendant was convicted of robbery, section 2B3.1 declares that the
base offense level (left margin) is set at twenty.36 However, this
31.

The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 98 Stat. at 2018 (codified at 28 U.S.C.

§ 991(b)(1) (2000».

32. 18 U.S.c. § 3553(a)(1) (2000).
33. Id. § 3553(a)(2).
34. Id. § 3551. Prisoners, however, may earn "good time" credits and be released
from prison, under supervision. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra
note 3, §§ 5D1.1, 5D1.2. See generally STITH & CABRANES, supra note 18, at 63.
35. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 3, § 5A, at 377; see infra
Appendix B.
36. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 3, § 2B3.1(a).
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level may be increased if a firearm was discharged during the com
mission of the robbery.37
The Guidelines also provide a point valuation for the crimimll
history of the defendant. Responding to the direction of Congress
to provide a system that accounts for the characteristics of the de
fendant, the Guidelines provide enhanced punishment for repeat
offenders. The Guidelines comment that
[a] defendant with a record of prior criminal behavior is more
culpable than a first offender. . .. General deterrence of crimi
nal conduct dictates ... that repeated criminal behavior will ag
gravate the need for punishment . . . . Repeated criminal
behavior is an indicator of a limited likelihood of successful
rehabilitation. 38

This results in more severe punishment for those defendants who
have a lengthy criminal past. 39 The severity of the sentence is de
termined by increasing the "criminal history category" of the
defendant.
In addition to adding points to the "base level" of the current
offense, prior convictions result in points that are aggregated to de
termine the criminal history category, which is represented by the
top margin of the Sentencing Table. 40 The number of points a de
fendant receives toward his criminal history category depends on
the length of the prior sentence; the circumstances surrounding
those convictions, including whether the criminal act was commit
ted while on probation, parole, supervised release, imprisonment,
work release, or escape status; and the timeliness of the current
crime in relation to the prior convictions. 41 By matching the appro
priate criminal history category (column) with the current offense
level (row), the court is given the precise range for the sentence to
37. [d. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(A).
38. Id. § 4Al.1, introductory cmt.
39. While the commentary to the Guidelines explains that repeat offenders will
have a sentence imposed with respect to the four principles of punishment, the in
creased length of punishment for repeat offenders leads to the logical conclusion that
incapacitation was the primary driving force behind the criminal history structure. See
STITH & CABRANES, supra note 18, at 55; see also Erik G. Luna, Foreword, Three
Strikes in a Nutshell, 20 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1998). In discussing California's
three strikes law, Erik Luna describes that increased punishment for recidivist offenders
incorporates two principles of punishment, incapacitation and deterrence. Id. For ad
ditional similar comments, see R. Daniel O'Connor, Note, Defining the Strike Zone
An Analysis of the Classification of Prior Convictions Under the Federal "Three-Strikes
and You're Out" Scheme, 36 B.c. L. REV. 847, 848 (1995).
40. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 3, § 4A1.1.
41. [d. § 4Al.1(d).
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be imposed. 42 Thus, to "avoid sentencing disparity 'among defend
ants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar
criminal conduct,' "43 the Sentencing Table provides an empirical
measure that normalizes sentences across the country. Repeat of
fenders with a history of multiple violent crimes will receive longer
sentences under the enhancement provisions described above,
while repeat offenders with a history of non-violent crimes receive
lower sentences. 44
In addition to section 4A1.1, under which the defendant's crim
inal history determines the criminal history category,45 part B of
chapter 4 of the Guidelines provides that in some circumstances, a
defendant's criminal history will increase both the criminal history
category and the base offense level. This effectively increases the
sentence to a much higher incarceration period than if only the base
level or the criminal history category were increased. Section 4B1.1
provides an enhancement for "career offenders."46 This section
provides:
A defendant is a career offender if (1) the defendant was at least
eighteen years old at the time the defendant committed the in
stant offense of conviction; (2) the instant offense of conviction is
a felony that is either a crime of violence or a controlled sub
stance offense; and (3) the defendant has at least two prior felony
convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance
offense. 47

Similar to the "career offender provision," which applies to defend
ants who fall within the definition of section 4B1.1 and commit any
crime punishable for more than a year, the Guidelines also contain
crime-specific multiple-offender enhancement provisions. Section
4B1.4 provides enhancement for "career offenders" whose current
offense is being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18
U.S.c. § 922(g). Even prior to the creation of the Guidelines, Con
gress had previously provided a specialized enhancement for multi
ple offenders who were convicted under 18 U.S.c. § 922(g), as part
42. See infra Appendix B.
43. STITII & CABRANES, supra note 18, at 71 (quoting 28 U.S.c. § 991(b)(1)(B)
(2000)).
44. For example, see supra text accompanying notes 1-6. If Price's prior convic
tion for carrying a concealed weapon was considered a non-violent crime, he would
have received a sentencing range of 12-18 months, as opposed to it being considered a
violent crime where the sentencing range is 30-37 months.
45. See supra text accompanying notes 40-42.
46. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 3, § 4B1.1(b).
47. Id. § 4Bl.l(a).
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of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA).48 Therefore, section
4B1.4, the "armed career criminal" provision in the Guidelines, in
corporates the ACCA.49
The ACCA provides sentencing enhancement for an individual
who is facing a current conviction of being a felon in possession of a
firearm in violation of 18 U.S.c. § 922(g), and who has three previ
ous convictions for violent felonies. In such a scenario, that individ
ual faces a minimum term of imprisonment of fifteen years. 50 The
Guidelines, through section 4B1.4, provide sentencing for "armed
career criminals" under the ACCA, ensuring that the sentence im
posed is at least the fifteen years as stated in ACCA and possibly
longer depending on further circumstances of the crime. 51 While
the ACCA requires a determination of whether a prior conviction
was for a "violent felony"52 and the Guidelines require a determi
nation of whether the prior convictions were "crimes of violence,"
they have been interpreted by the courts to encompass the same
crimes,53 and both are interpreted to have the same meaning.
48. Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, ch. 18,98 Stat. 2185,
repealed by Firearms Owners' Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 99-308, § 104, 100 Stat. 458
(1986) (current version at 18 U.S.c. § 924(e)(1) (2000».
49. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 3, § 4B1.4 cmt. back
ground ("This section implements 18 U.S.c. § 924(e) [Armed Career Criminal Act].").
50. Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984, § 1802.
51. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 3, §§ 4B1.4(b), (c). Sub
section (b)(3)(B) provides that the base offense level is set at 33, and subsection (c)(3)
provides that the lowest possible criminal history category is Category IV. This will
result in a minimum sentence of 188 months or 15 and one-half years. Subsections (b)
and (c) both provide for an increase in the base offense level and an increase in the
criminal history category if certain circumstances are present. It is not necessary for
this Note to delve into all the possible factual scenarios that may result in a given case.
For further information, see id.
52. 18 U.S.c. § 924(e)(I) (2000).
53. Although the commentary accompanying § 4B1.4 declares that the "defini
tions of 'violent felony' and 'serious drug offense' in 18 U.S.c. § 924(e)(2) (2000) are
not identical to the definitions of 'crime of violence' and 'controlled substance offense'
used in § 4B1.1," at least in the context of violent felony and crime of violence, the
differences are minor. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 3, § 4B1.4,
cmt. n.1. Compare 18 U.S.c. § 924(e)(2)(B) (emphasis added) (defining "violent fel
ony" as any crime punishable for a term exceeding one year ... that ... (i) has as an
element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person
of another; or (ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves the use of explosives, or
otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to
another"), with U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 3, § 4B1.2(a) (em
phasis added) ("The term 'crime of violence' means any offense under federal or state
law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that-(I) has as an
element the use, attempted use or threatened use of physical force against the person of
another, or (2) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives,
or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to
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Therefore, whether a prior conviction is considered a crime of vio
lence has a direct impact on both the criminal history category and
the base offense level of a defendant facing sentencing under sec
tions 4B1.1 and 4B1.4.

C.

The "Advisory" Guidelines-Post Booker v. United States

The sentencing dynamic changed again ~vith a constitutional
challenge of the Guidelines in 2005, in Booker v. United States .54
The Supreme Court found that, in certain cases, the Guidelines op
erated unconstitutionally.55 The Court held that "[a]ny fact (other
than a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence
exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts established by a
plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant or
proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt."56 The Court's hold
ing rested upon Sixth Amendment57 grounds, that the "interest in
fairness and reliability protected by the right to a jury trial ... has
always outweighed the interest in concluding trials swiftly."58 The
Court further held that if the Guidelines were not mandatory and
binding on judges, "the selection of particular sentences in response
to differing sets of facts .. } would not implicate the Sixth Amend
ment. "59 To accomplish the goal of rendering the Guidelines advi
sory instead of mandatory, the Court excised two sections of the
Guidelines,60 18 U.S.c. § 3553(b)(1)61 and 18 U.S.c. § 3742(e).62
another."). See also United States v. Gilbert, 138 F.3d 1371, 1372 (11th Cir. 1998)
(holding the definitions of "violent felony" and "crime of violence" as identical and that
the interpretation of one can be used for the other); O'Connor, supra note 39, at 851.
54. Booker v. United States, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
55. The constitutional concern arose when a defendant's sentence was increased
due to the application of the Guidelines' provisions, above the statutory maximum for
the crime for which the jury issued its verdict. Id. at 244.
56. Id.
57. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment provides that "[i]n all crimi
nal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the' right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed."
Id.
58. Booker, 543 U.S. at 244.
59. Id. at 233.
60. Id. at 259-61.
61. 18 U.S.c. § 3553(b )(1) (2000) ("The court shall impose a sentence of the kind,
and within the range, referred to in subsection (a)(4) unless the court finds that there
exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not ade
quately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the
guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that described .... ").
62. 18 U.s.c. § 3742(e) (2000) (concerning the judicial review of sentencing ac
cording to the Guidelines that maintains the "mandatory" nature of the Guidelines).
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By rendering the Guidelines merely advisory, the Court dimin
ished the power of the Guidelines. However, the Guidelines' im
portance has not been diminished. While courts are not strictly
"bound by the federal guidelines, [they] must continue to consult
the provisions of the federal guidelines and consider them in sen
tencing. "63 This consideration "necessarily requires the sentencing
court to calculate the Guidelines sentencing range in the same man
ner as before Booker."64 Following the calculation of a sentence
according to the Guidelines, the court may "impose a more severe
or more lenient sentence as long as the sentence is reasonable."65
Therefore, the Booker decision has little impact on the importance
of determining the applicability, scope, and interpretation of the
provisions of the Guidelines.
D.

Ascertaining the Scope of the Crime of Violence Provision

While the Guidelines have reduced the influence and discre
tion of the judiciary in the area of sentencing, judges still retain an
important interpretive role. The provisions in the Guidelines are
sometimes broad, ambiguous, or unclear, so judges must determine
which provisions are applicable, and their proper scope. As illus
trated in the Introduction above, the determination that a prior
conviction of carrying a concealed weapon was a crime of violence
could nearly double the sentence received.66
1. The Plain Language of the Crime of Violence Provision
The crime of violence provision has been a fertile source for
judicial analysis. The crime of violence provision has two main
clauses and attempts to provide an inclusive illustration of the
crimes intended by the drafters to be within the scope of the en
hancement provision. In order for any crime to be considered a
crime of violence, it must be one to which the defendant could have
been punished by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year,67
63. United States v. Davila-Rodriguez, 166 F. App'x 399, 402 (11th Cir. 2006); see
also United States v. Crawford, 407 F.3d 1174, 1178 (11th Cir. 2005).
64. Crawford, 407 F.3d at 1178-79 (quoting United States v. Shelton, 400 F.3d
1325, 1332 n.9 (11th Cir. 2005)).
65. Id. at 1179.
66. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
67. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 3, § 4B1.2(a); see also id.
§ 4A1.1 cmt. background. The defendant need not have served more than a year;
rather, the availability of a term of imprisonment exceeding a year must have existed.
The purpose for this is that the Commission recognized that "[t]here are jurisdictional
variations in offense definitions, sentencing structures, and manner of sentence pro
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and it must also fit within one of the two clauses of the statute. The
first clause requires that in order for a prior conviction to be a
crime of violence it must "[have] as an element the use, attempted
use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of an
other. "68 The second clause includes a conviction that "is burglary
of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or oth
erwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of
physical injury to another. "69 In short, the crime of violence provi
sion separates the included offenses into two subcategories; (1)
physical force crimes and (2) non-physical-force crimes that create
a serious risk of physical injury to another.
2.

The Commentary Accompanying the Guidelines
Provision

In addition to the language of the provision, the Sentencing
Commission included commentary (Commentary) to the Guide
lines designed to "provide[] concrete guidance" as to how to apply
the provisions, and thus, the Commentary accompanying the crime
of violence provision is helpful in determining its scope.?o The Su
preme Court in Stinson v. United States established the binding
force of the Commentary to the Guidelines.?1 Stinson pleaded
guilty to robbery of a bank in Florida.72 The district court sen
tenced Stinson as a career criminal under § 4B1.2 of the Guidelines
as a result of two prior convictions, which the court determined
were predicate offenses within the scope of the crime of violence
provision.?3 Among Stinson's prior convictions was one for unlaw
ful possession of a firearm by a felon in violation of 18 U.S.c.
§ 922(g).74 Stinson appealed his sentence, claiming that the district
court improperly interpreted his firearm possession conviction as a
crime of violence.?5 The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
nouncement," which require individualized consideration. Id. Furthermore, "[tJo mini
mize problems with imperfect measures of past crime seriousness, criminal history
categories are based on the maximum term imposed in previous sentences rather than
on other measures, such as whether the conviction was designated a felony or misde
meanor." Id.
68. [d. § 4B1.2(a)(I).
69. Id. § 4B1.2(a)(2).
70. Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 44 (1993).
71. Id. at 37-38.
72. Id. at 38.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 39.
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held, however, that the possession of a firearm by a felon "was, as a
categorical matter, a crime of violence."76
Following the Eleventh Circuit's denial of Stinson's appeal, the
Sentencing Commission amended the Commentary to the crime of
violence provision. 77 The amendment provided that a "'crime of
violence' does not include the offense of unlawful possession of a
firearm by a felon. "78 Stinson filed a second appeal in the Eleventh
Circuit seeking retroactive application of the Commentary.79 The
Eleventh Circuit denied Stinson's second appeal for a rehearing on
the issue, holding that the Commentary to the Guidelines is not
binding on the courtS.80 The Supreme Court, however, disagreed
with the Eleventh Circuit's characterization of the Commentary,
and held that the Commentary is binding on the courts provided
that it "does not violate the Constitution or a federal statute [and
that] it must be given 'controlling weight unless it is plainly errone
ous or inconsistent with the regulation."'81 Furthermore, the Court
noted that the Commentary "represent[s] the most accurate indica
tions of how the Commission deems that the guidelines should be
applied to be consistent with the Guidelines Manual."82 Thus, the
Commentary accompanying the Guidelines is binding authority on
the courts.
The Commentary accompanying the crime of violence provi
sion separates "crimes of violence" from non-violent crimes by es
tablishing inclusive lists of crimes. "'Crime of violence' includes
murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, aggravated assault, forcible sex
offenses, robbery, arson, extortion, extortionate extension of credit,
and burglary of a dwelling."83 The crime of violence provision ex

76.
77.
78.

Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, § 4B1.2, cmt. n.2
(1993»; see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 3, § 4B1.2, cmt.
n.1.
79. United States v. Stinson, 957 F.2d 813 (11th Cir. 1992), vacated, Stinson v.
United States, 508 U.S. 36 (1993). The court noted that "[a]lthough commentary should
generally be regarded as persuasive, it is not binding." Id. at 815. Furthermore, they
were doubtful of the Sentencing Commissions' power through amendment to nullify the
precedent of the circuit courts. Id.
80. Id. at 815.
81. Stinson, 508 U.S. at 45 (quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325
U.S. 410, 414 (1945».
82. Id.
83. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 3, § 4B1.2, cmt. n.1.
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plicitly illustrates only one excluded crime in the Commentary-the
crime of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon. 84
Therefore, the Commentary provides a non-exhaustive list of
crimes to be included or excluded under the crime of violence pro
vision, and while such a list may be helpful, it is incomplete. 85 Thus,
it does not provide absolute guidance to the courts in determining
whether to include offenses that are not enumerated in the statute
or in the Commentary.
3.

The Legislative History of the Crime of Violence
Provision of the Armed Career Criminal Act

Further guidance into the scope of the crime of violence provi
sion can be found in the legislative history of the ACCA. The
ACCA is a "crime specific" enhancement provision that operates
identically to, and is interpreted to coincide with, the general crime
of violence enhancement provision of the Guidelines. 86 The ACCA
began as an enhancement for convicted felons who "receive[ ], pos
sess[ ], or transport[ ] ... a firearm" if the defendant had been pre
viously convicted of three felonies of robbery or burglary.87 In
1986, this provision was recodified as 18 V.S.c. § 924(e)88 and
amended again by replacing the term "any felony" with "any crime
punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year. "89 Sec
tion 924(e) was further amended less than six months later, ex
panding the predicate offenses by replacing "robbery or burglary"
with any "violent felony or serious drug offense. "90
Following further debate, Congress proposed two versions of
the ACCA in order to establish a consensus over the definition of a
crime of violence. The first, proposed by Senator Specter in the
Senate and Representative Wyden in the House, defined "crime of
violence" as "'an offense that has as an element the use, attempted
use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or prop
84. Id.
85. Cj id. ("Other offenses are included a.s 'crimes of violence' if (A) that offense
has as an element the use ... of physical force against the person of another, or (B) the
conduct set forth ... presented a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.").
86. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
87. Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1802,98 Stat. 2185,
repealed by Firearms Owners' Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-308, § 104, 100
Stat. 458 (current version at 18 U.S.c. § 924(e)(I) (2000)).
88. Firearm Owner's Protection Act, § 104.
89. Id.
90. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 582 (1990) (citing Career Criminals
Amendment Act of 1986 § 1402, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207-37,3207-37 to -38).
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erty of another,' or any felony 'that, by its nature, involves a sub
stantial risk that physical force against the person or property of
another may be used in the course of committing the offense.' "91
The second bill narrowly defined "crime of violence" as "an offense
that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of
physical force against the person ... of another."92 The compro
mise of both of these bills is the current definition used in
§ 924(e).93 What is significant is that the House Report concerning
this compromise further described that debate centered on the con
cern of including "violent felonies ... against property."94
Following this legislative history, the Supreme Court in Taylor
v. United States 95 had to determine what type of burglaries the pro
vision intended to include in the second clause, which explicitly re
fers to burglary.96 The Court declared that, in creating the ACCA,
"Congress focused its efforts on career offenders-those who com
mit a large number of fairly serious crimes as their means of liveli
hood. "97 The Court further observed that the predicate offenses
were not limited to crimes actually involving violence, as contained
in the first clause, but they also extended to some property crimes,
including burglary, "because of [those crimes'] inherent potential
for harm to persons. "98
Therefore the legislative history of the crime of violence provi
sion of the ACCA provides a solid foundation for ascertaining the
provision's scope. First, the history indicates that the provision in
cludes all offenses that have as an element, a violent act. 99 Second,
the drafters intended to include certain property crimes which may
not result in actual physical violence, but include conduct that in
creases the risk of violence to such a degree that they should be
treated as violent crimes.

91. Id. at 583 (citing S. 2312, 99th Congo (1986) and H.R. 4639, 99th Congo
(1986».
92. Id. (citing H.R. 4768, 99th Congo (1986)).
93. See supra note 53.
94. H.R. REP. No. 99-849, at 3 (1986).
95. Taylor, 495 U.S. 575.
96. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 3, § 4B1.2(a)(2).
97. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 587.
98. Id. at 588.
99. A violent act in this respect is represented by the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force.
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Scope of Judicial Review: A Categorical Approach to
the Guidelines

Determining the scope of the crime of violence provision is not
limited to a plain language analysis coupled with the intent of the
drafters. In addition to these tools of statutory construction, it is
also necessary to determine the permissible inquiry of the court into
the past crime. In Taylor v. United States, the Supreme Court held
that a trial court must take a formal categorical approach to a prior
conviction and cannot look into the facts surrounding the convic
tion to determine if it is a crime of violence. loo A formal categorical
approach limits the sentencing court's inquiry to include only the
conviction documents together with the statutory definition of the
crime. The alternative approach, a fact-finding based approach that
allows a sentencing court to look into the particular facts of the
prior conviction, was held by the Court to be improper on two
grounds. lOl
First, the Court held that the text itself supports a categorical
approach, and not a fact-finding based approach. The Guidelines
use terms that are broad and detached from a specific factual cir
cumstance. Section 924( e) "refers to 'a person who ... has three
convictions' for-not a person who has committed-three previous
violent felonies," suggesting that the focus is on a detached review
of the conviction record and not the particular actions of the defen
dant.1°2 Furthermore, the provision applies to "any crime" that
"has [violence] as an element," which is significantly broader than if
the provision used the phrase, "any crime, that in a particular case"
involved violence. 103
Second, the legislative history illustrates that Congress in
tended a categorical approach, namely that if a court was supposed
to "engage in an elaborate fact finding process regarding the defen
dant's prior offenses, surely this would have been mentioned some
where in the legislative history."104 The Court also noted that a
fact-finding based approach could lead to a possible violation of the
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury.lOS
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600-02.
Id.
Id. at 600-01 (quoting 18 U.S.c. § 924(e» (omission in original).
Id. at 600.
Id. at 601.
Id.
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Therefore, in determining whether a prior convIctIOn is in
cluded within the crime of violence provision, a court may only look
at the statutory definitions of the crime of which the defendant was
convicted. Additionally, a court must only determine whether the
conduct, expressed through the elements of the crime, presents a
"serious risk of physical injury to another. "106 For example, exigent
factors, such as intent to injure, cannot be used as a basis for deter
mining whether the defendant's conduct presented a serious risk of
injury, unless the intent was an element of the crime for which the
defendant was found guilty.107
A formal categorical approach, in limiting the permissible ar
eas of inquiry for a sentencing court, attempts to normalize sentenc
ing among the federal courts. 108 Since a sentencing court must look
at the generic definition of a crime through the elements of con
duct, differences between state laws are reduced to common ele
ments of conduct.
E.

Carrying a Concealed Weapon

In order to determine whether any crime should fall within the
scope of the crime of violence provision, it is necessary to under
stand the elements of the crime and the pertinent and informative
aspects of that crime. This section will provide an analysis of the
crime of carrying a concealed weapon. It will first explore the pro
hibited conduct by illustrating the generic common elements of the
crime. Next, it will provide a comparative analysis between the dif
ferent state laws, illustrating that the prohibition of carrying a con
cealed weapon differs vastly among the states. Finally, this section
will look at the circumstances in which it is permissible to carry a
concealed weapon.
1.

State Law Analysis of the Prohibited Conduct

The crime of unlawfully carrying a concealed weapon is prima
rily governed by state law 109 and is based upon the principle of gen
106. See id. at 602.
107. See id. (citation omitted) (holding that a court must only look at "the fact of
conviction and the statutory definition of the prior offense. This categorical approach
... may permit the sentencing court to go beyond the mere fact of conviction in a
narrow range of cases where a jury was actually required to find all the elements ....").
108. See id. at 590-92.
109. There are federal laws that prohibit carrying a concealed weapon in specific
circumstances. For example, 49 V.S.c. § 46505(b)(1) (2000) prohibits a person who,
"when on, or attempting to get on, an aircraft in, or intended for operation in, air trans
portation or intrastate air transportation, has on or about the individual or the property
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eral deterrence. uo Its aim is not to curb a direct wrong against
another person or a person's property, but rather, to deter someone
from having the instrument to commit a wrong against a person in
the future. l11 It is essentially a preventative crime. In State v. Chip
pey, the court explained one rationale for crirninalizing the act of
carrying a concealed weapon.1 12 The charge to the jury explained
that:
Every statute has some purpose and meaning. The object of this
statute is to prevent the carrying of concealed deadly weapons
about the person; because, persons becoming suddenly angered
and having such a weapon in their pocket, would be likely to use
it, which in their sober moments they would not have done, and
which could not have been done had not the weapon been upon
their person. l13

There are three general elements of the crime of carrying a
concealed weapon. First, the person must knowingly possess a fire
arm.114 Second, the firearm must be concealed. us The term "con
cealment" is broad and opens the door to a wide range of factual
of the individual a concealed dangerous weapon that is or would be accessible to the
individual in flight." See also 18 U.S.c. § 922(q)(2)(A) (2000), which makes it "unlaw
ful for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm that has moved in or that other
wise affects interstate or foreign commerce at a place that the individual knows, or has
reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone." 18 u.s.c. § 922(q)(2)(A) (2000). This
Note, however, focuses on state law for several reasons. First, the federal statutes, as
the ones above indicate, share the same elements as the state crimes, and thus would
not affect the analysis of this Note. Second, the power of the federal government to
regulate firearms possession is limited. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995),
superseded by statute on other grounds, Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act,
1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 101(f), 110 Stat. 3009 (1996). In determining whether Con
gress has the authority to criminalize possession of a firearm on school property, the
Lopez Court noted that '''[s]tates possess primary authority for defining and enforcing
the criminal law.'" Id. at n.3 (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 635 (1993)).
The Court held that Congress may only regulate such possession within the constricted
powers of the Commerce Clause. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 565-66; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, d.
3. Since this regulatory power is limited, the case law pertinent to this Note is absent.
On the other hand, the issue of this Note has arisen out of state law convictions, and
thus, this Note focuses only on state laws.
110. See supra note 28 (definition of deterrence).
111. William Meyerhofer, Note, Statutory Restrictions on Weapons Possessions:
Must the Right to Self-Defense Fall Victim?, 1996 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 219, 220-21 (1996)
(stating that "[t]he theory behind the efficacy of [weapons] laws is simple: preventing
the possession of a weapon will prevent any opportunity for its misuse").
112. State v. Chippey, 33 A. 438, 438 (Del. 1892).
113. Id.
114. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 571.030(1) (West, Westlaw through 2006
legislation).
115. Id.

2007]

THE MEANING OF VIOLENCE

819

determinations, but the simplest explanation is that the weapon be
"hidden from common observation."116 The third factor is that the
weapon must be "readily accessible" for use, distinguishing the
crime of carrying a concealed weapon from mere possession of a
firearm.ll7 Although not explicit in the text of concealed weapons
statutes, the courts have generally inferred this requirement when
interpreting the requirement that the weapon must be "on or
about" the person. 11S In State v. Blazovitch, the court interpreted
the phrase "about" to include carrying a weapon in a bag or satchel
as being within the spirit of the law, which was to prevent a person
from unlawfully having access to a weapon. 119 The importance of
the manner of concealment, i.e., whether the weapon is "on" the
person or "about," has also been broadened to include having the
weapon "in such proximity to the person as to be convenient of
access and within immediate physical reach" even In an
automobile. 120
While these three elements are common to most state laws,
they are not universal, and there can be striking differences be
tween the states in the punishable conduct with regard to the pos
session or carrying of a weapon. For example, some states do not
require that a weapon be concealed in order to violate a "carrying"
law. 121 In fact, Massachusetts, which has one the most stringent
116. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-308(A) (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation).
117. See, e.g., People v. Bolling, 537 N.E.2d 1100, 1102-03 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989);
State v. Nebbitt, 713 S.W.2d 49, 50 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); State v. Erickson, 362 N.W.2d
528, 532 (Iowa 1985); Bailey v. State, 442 So. 2d 385, 386 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983);
Commonwealth v. Lanzetti, 97 Pa. Super. 126, 128 (1929).
118. Bolling, 537 N.E.2d at 1102-03; Nebbitt, 713 S.W.2d at 50; Erickson, 362
N.W.2d at 532; Bailey, 442 So. 2d at 386; Lanzetti, 97 Pa. Super. at 128.
119. State v. Blazovitch, 107 S.E. 291 (W.Va. 1921).
To come within the letter or terms of the statute, however, the act must
amount to a carrying of such weapon about the person of the accused. It need
not be on his person within the strict meaning of these words. If carried in a
container of some kind held in the hand of the accused, it is manifestly about
his person, though it may not be on his person.
Id. at 292.
120. Hampton v. Commonwealth, 78 S.W.2d 748, 749-50 (Ky. 1934).
121. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-73-120 (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-206(a) (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation); D.C.
CODE § 22-4504 (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-47-2
1(a), 35-47-2-23(c) (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 269,
§ 10 (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 624.714(1)(a)
(West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:39-5(b) (West, Westlaw
through 2006 legislation).
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penalties, does not require concealment122 or even that the firearm
be loaded to be a violation. 123
The penalties for carrying a concealed weapon in violation of
the law also differ dramatically among the states. Below is a table
that illustrates the maximum penalties for all fifty states and the
District of Columbia.
Maximum Imprisonment Term124
Lawful to Carry a Concealed Weapon:

Alaska, Vermont
30 Days:
North Carolina, Oklahoma
90 Days:
South Carolina, Washington
6 Months:

Alabama, Arizona, Idaho, Louisiana, Mississippi, Montana,
New Mexico, Ohio, Oregon, Wyoming
One year:
Arkansas, California, Colorado, District of Columbia, Georgia,
Hawaii, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Minnesota, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Hampshire, North Dakota, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Texas, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin
Exceeding One Year:
Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Maryland, Mas
sachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Penn
sylvania, Rhode Island
By comparing the laws of the fifty states and the District of
Columbia, several observations can be made. First, there is a wide
122. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 269, § 10.
123. Id. If State v. Chippey provides an accurate reasoning for restricting the car
rying of a concealed weapon, the law in Massachusetts seems to be an anomaly. In
Chippey, the reasoning of the prohibition was premised upon carrying a deadly weapon
and using it against another when angered. See supra notes 112-113 and accompanying
text. In Massachusetts, apparently, a person is prohibited from carrying even a non
deadly (i.e., unloaded) firearm. It makes this author wonder exactly what the reasoning
in Massachusetts is for their restriction of unloaded firearms.
124. See infra Appendix A, notes 197-202, for citations to the applicable state
laws that provided the information for this table.
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range of penalties for carrying a concealed weapon, from no pen
alty125 in Alaska and Vermont to the possibility of a ten-year sen
tence in Rhode Island. 126 Second, and most important, not all state
statutes could invoke a crime of violence analysis for a subsequent
conviction in federal court. This is because the Guidelines require
that in order for a prior conviction to be considered a crime of vio
lence it must be a crime for which the person could have served
more than one year in prison. 127 Of the fifty states and the District
of Columbia, only thirteen have laws under which carrying a con
cealed weapon could be considered a "crime of violence" under the
Guidelines: Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Mary
land, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, New York,
Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island. 128 In the other thirty-eight states
and the District of Columbia, a conviction for carrying a concealed
weapon could never be considered a crime of violence for enhance
ment purposes of a later crime in federal court. 129
125. While Alaska and Vermont do not criminalize the general conduct of carry
ing a concealed weapon, they do provide some restrictions. See ALASKA STAT.
§ 11.61.220 (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation), which provides that any person
over the age of 21 can carry a concealed weapon, except that they cannot carry a
weapon into a courthouse, schoolyard, bar, or domestic violence shelter. Vermont's
pertinent statute allows anyone to carry a concealed weapon so long as he does not do
so with "the intent or avowed purpose of injuring a fellow man," and does not do so
"within any state institution or upon the grounds or lands owned or leased for the use
of such institution, without the approval of the warden or superintendent of the institu
tion." VT. STAT. ANN. tit. l3, § 4003 (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation).
126. R.1. GEN. LAWS § 11-47-8(a) (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation).
127. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 3, § 4B1.2(a) (requiring
that the crime must be "punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year").
128. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-206(a); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 1442 (prohi
bition), 4205 (punishment) (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 790.01(2)-(3) (prohibition), 775.082 (punishment) (West, Westlaw through 2006 leg
islation); 720 ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 5/24-1.6(a), (d) (prohibition); 730 ILL. COMPo
STAT. ANN. 515-8-1(a)(7) (punishment) (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 724.4(1) (prohibition), 903.1(2) (punishment) (West, Westlaw through
2006 legislation); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 4-101(West, Westlaw through 2006
legislation); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 269, § 10; MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. §§ 750.227(2)-(3)
(West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 571.030(1)(5) (prohibi
tion), 558.011(1)(4) (punishment) (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation); N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§ 2C:39-5(b) (prohibition), 2C:43-6(a)(3) (punishment) (West, Westlaw through
2006 legislation); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 265.02(6) (prohibition), 70.00(2)(d) (punishment)
(West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 6106(a)(I) (pro
hibition), 1103(3), 1104(1) (punishment) (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation); R.1.
GEN. LAWS § 11-47-8(a) (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation).
129. This raises an interesting dilemma in that persons convicted in the thirteen
states listed could face enhancement, while persons convicted in the remaining thirty
eight jurisdictions could not. It would seem then, that it may be impossible to normal
ize sentencing across the country, which will be discussed further in this Note. See infra
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Authorized Conduct: States Permit Carrying a Concealed
Weapon Through a Permitting Process

In addition to the striking differences in how states punish the
crime, carrying a concealed weapon is not categorically prohibited.
As described above, Alaska and Vermont do not prohibit the act at
all,13° and the thirteen states that have laws that could fall under the
crime of violence provision l31 actually allow certain persons to
carry a concealed weapon. Carrying of a concealed weapon is per
missible if a person goes through a permitting process. l32 While
these thirteen states have unique and specific requirements, there
are common requirements among all states in determining the eligi
bility of a person to carry a concealed weapon.
First, the person must be of minimum legal age, usually eigh
teen or twenty-one. l33 Second, a criminal history background
check is required because prior criminal convictions may be a basis
for denial, depending on the type of crime committed. l34 The third
common requirement is that the person must complete a certified
Part II. Aside from any arguments that may stem from this particular conundrum,
which will not be entertained in this Note, it does illustrate that the crime of carrying a
concealed weapon does not have universal application.
130. ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.220; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4003.
131. That is, these states have laws which punish the crime by imprisonment ex
ceeding one year as required by the crime of violence provision.
132. See infra text accompanying notes 133-137.
133. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 29-28(b)(10); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§ 1441(a)(I) (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation) ("of full age"); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 790.06(2)(b) (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation); 430 ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 65/
4(a)(2)(i) (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation); IOWA CODE ANN. § 724.8(1) (West,
Westlaw through 2006 legislation) (eighteen years of age); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 140,
§ 122 ("not a minor"); MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 28.422(3)(b) (West, Westlaw
through 2006 legislation); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 571.090(1)(1) (West, Westlaw through
2006 legislation); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:58-3(c) (West, Westlaw through 2006 legisla
tion); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 400.00(1)(a) (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation); 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6109(b) (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 11-47-11(a) (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation).
134. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 29-28(b)(2); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 11, § 1441(a)(I)
(West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.06(2)(d) (West,
Westlaw through 2006 legislation); 430 ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 65/4(a)(2)(ii) (West,
Westlaw through 2006 legislation); IOWA CODE ANN. § 724.8(2) (West, Westlaw
through 2006 legislation); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 140, § 131P(a); MICH. COMPo LAWS
ANN. §§ 28.422(3)(d)-(e) (West, West law through 2006 legislation); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 571.090(1)(2) (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation); N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 400.00(1)(c) (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§§ 6109(e)(i)(iii)-(iv) (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation); R.1. GEN. LAWS § 11
47-11(a) (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation).
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firearms handling course. 135 Additionally, the permitting process of
some states may require a determination of whether the person is
of "good moral character"136 or whether the issuing authority has
"probable cause to believe that the applicant would be a threat to
himself or herself or to other individuals."137 While the general
purpose of prohibiting a person from carrying a concealed weapon,
as artfully stated in State v. Chippey,138 is that a person may present
a risk to others with a weapon in hand because people can be sud
denly angered, and thus, act violently, the states have drawn a line
determining that the danger lies within the characteristics of the
person carrying the weapons and not the mere act of carrying.
Therefore, the states have uniformly developed a system that allows
"safe" persons to carry a concealed weapon, and prevents "unsafe"
persons from doing the same.
F.

An Analysis of Case Law Concerning the Interpretation of
Weapons Possession/Carrying Crimes Under the Crime of
Violence Provision

The courts of appeals are split over the issue of whether a prior
state conviction of carrying a concealed weapon is a crime of vio
lence under the Guidelines. The primary issue of dispute between
the courts is whether carrying a concealed weapon "presents a seri
ous potential risk of physical injury to another. "139
In 1991, in United States v. Whitfield, the Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit held that the defendant's prior concealed
weapons conviction was not within the scope of the "other
wise c1ause."140 The court did, however, note that "[a]lthough
carrying an illegal weapon may involve a continuing risk to others,
the harm is not so immediate as to 'present[] a serious potential
risk of physical injury to another,'" as required by 18 U.S.c.
135. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 29-28(b)(1); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 11, § 1441(a)(3);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.06(2)(h); 447 ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 35/35-35(d) (West,
Westlaw through 2006 legislation); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 724.9-.11; MASS. GEN. LAWS
ch. 140, § 131P(a); MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 28.422(3)(h)(i); N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 400.00(1)(f).
136. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1441(a); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 400.00(1)(b); 18
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6109(d)(3) (requiring that the sheriff "shall investigate whether
the applicant's character and reputation are such that the applicant will not be likely to
act in a manner dangerous to public safety").
137. MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 28.422(3).
138. State V. Chippey, 33 A. 438, 438 (Del. 1892).
139. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 3, § 4B1.2(a)(2).
140. United States V. Whitfield, 907 F.2d 798, 800 (8th Cir. 1990); see infra note
155 and accompanying text.
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§ 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).141 Recently, in the 2002 case of United States v.

Crawley,142 a district court in the Tenth Circuit reviewed the issue
of whether the defendant's prior Missouri conviction for carrying a
concealed weapon was a crime of violence under the Guidelines. 143
The court, persuaded by the reasoning in Whitfield, concluded that
carrying a concealed weapon is not a crime of violence. 144 Most
notably, the court also commented that the actual location of the
firearm, whether on the person or readily accessible by its proxi
mate location to the person,145 makes no difference in the analysis
of whether the conviction is a crime of violence or not. 146 Instead,
the court held:
That the weapon is found on the person rather than on the floor
board or seat of a vehicle is not enough in itself to say the risk of
physical injury created by a firearm's presence is now serious.
The court is not satisfied that the imminence or likelihood of vio
lence associated with a person carrying a weapon is appreciably
different from that presented when the weapon is simply other
wise readily available to a person. 147

Therefore, in both the Eighth and Tenth Circuits, the courts have
concluded that the risk involved in carrying a concealed weapon
does not rise to the level required by the crime of violence
provIsIon.
The Eleventh Circuit, however, has consistently held that car
rying a concealed weapon is a crime of violence because the risk
created by the conduct reaches the level required by the provision.
Since being overruled in Stinson v. United States, 148 which resulted
in the crime of being a felon in possession of a firearm being ex
cluded from the crime of violence provision, the Eleventh Circuit
141. Whitfield, 907 F.2d at 800.
142. United States v. Crawley, 213 F. Supp. 2d 1250 (D. Kan. 2002).
143. Id. at 1253.
144. Id. at 1256.
145. To satisfy the element of having a weapon "on or about" the person, the
firearm could be located on the person, in a bag, or in a car, see supra text accompany
ing notes 118-120.
146. Crawley, 213 F. Supp. 2d at 1256-57. Although not an argument raised in
this Note, the court's comments anticipate further arguments on the issue, that the risk
created by the conduct may change in particular circumstances. Ultimately, however,
this would be a failing argument since the court is restricted to a formal categorical
approach and cannot inquire into the specific conduct of a defendant, unless that con
duct is expressed in the elements of the crime. See supra text accompanying notes 100
108.
147. Crawley, 213 F. Supp. 2d at 1256.
148. See supra text accompanying notes 81-84.
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has attempted to provide support for including the crime of carry
ing a concealed weapon as a crime of violence by drawing a distinc
tion from unlawful possession by a felon.
Beginning with United States v. HaLl,149 and continuing to
United States v. Price,150 the Eleventh Circuit has remained consis
tent in its decisions. 151 In Hall, the Eleventh Circuit accepted the
government's argument on appeal that carrying a concealed
weapon is an "active conduct crime" and that the danger extends
beyond "mere possession" because "the person has taken the extra
step of having the weapon immediately accessible for use on
another. "152
Thus, the courts of appeals have diverged over the interpreta
tion of whether carrying a concealed weapon is a "crime of vio
lence." The case law described above illustrates that this issue has
been reduced to a simple analysis and judgment of the risk created
by the conduct. Because evaluating risk is invariably a subjective
endeavor, the conflicting conclusions of these courts should not
come as a surprise. It is this SUbjectivity that is at the heart of the
argument set forth in Part II below.
II.

ANALYSIS

This Note argues that a prior conviction for carrying a con
cealed weapon is not a crime of violence under the enhancement
provisions in the United States Sentencing Guidelines. First, by
utilizing the canon of statutory interpretation, ejusdem generis, the
crime of carrying a concealed weapon is excluded from the scope of
the provision since it is dissimilar to the enumerated crimes in the
provision. Second, assuming that the first argument fails to per
suade the courts, this Note provides an alternate reason why the
crime is not within the scope of the provision. The second argu
ment focuses on the insufficiency of the current approach to analyz
ing the crime of violence provision taken by the courts, and
introduces a proper approach, which yields only one conclusion,
that carrying a concealed weapon is not a "crime of violence."
149. United States v. Hall, 77 F.3d 398 (11th Cir. 1996).
150. United States v. Price, 132 F. App'x 341, 343 (11th Cir. 2005).
151. See Hall, 77 F.3d at 401; United States v. Gilbert, 138 F.3d 1371, 1372 (11th
Cir. 1998) (holding that carrying a concealed weapon is a crime of violence, relying on
the holding in Hall, 77 F.3d at 401); see also Price, 132 F. App'x at 343 (holding the
same by referring to Hall, 77 F.3d at 401, Gilbert, 138 F.3d at 1372, and United States v.
Adams, 316 F.3d 1196 (11th Cir. 2003».
152. Hall, 77 F.3d at 401.
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Carrying a concealed weapon is not within the scope of the
crime of violence provision since it is dissimilar, in nature and char
acteristics, to the enumerated crimes in the provision. A crime of
violence is defined as:
[A]ny offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprison
ment for a term exceeding one year, that-(l) has as an element
the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force
against the person of another, or (2) is burglary of a dwelling,
arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise in
volves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical in
jury to another .153

Since carrying a concealed weapon is not one of the enumer
ated crimes listed within this definition,154 its inclusion must neces
sarily fall in the provision of "otherwise involves conduct that
presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another"
(hereinafter the "otherwise clause").155 The "otherwise clause,"
however, is not an independent and separate clause in the provi
sion, but rather, is tied directly to the entire second clause, which
explicitly enumerates includable offenses such as burglary, arson,
and extortion. 156
Ejusdem generis is a canon of interpretation declaring that a
"general term" must be interpreted "to reflect the class of objects
reflected in more specific terms accompanying it."157 In Circuit City
Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 158 which provides an illustration of the canon
ejusdem generis and its application, the Supreme Court invoked the
canon while interpreting a broad, general statutory term.159 In Cir
cuit City, the plaintiff Adams brought suit alleging discrimination,
153. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 3, § 4B1.2 (emphasis
added).
154. Simply, it does not have as an element "the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force," nor is it a "burglary ... , arson, or extortion, [nor]
involves use of explosives." See id.
155. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2000); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MAN
UAL, supra note 3, §§ 2K2.1, 4B1.2.
156. For similar comments, see Jeremy D. Feinstein, Note, Are Threats Always
"Violent" Crimes?, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1067, 1085 (1996).
157. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY, & ELIZABETH GARRETT,
LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 375 (2000).
158. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
159. Id. at 114.
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and sought to avoid the arbitration provision in his employment ap
plication through an exemption in the Federal Arbitration Act.160
At issue was the scope of the exemptions to the Federal Arbitration
Act,161 which provides for the exclusion "from the Act's coverage
'contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any
other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate com
merce.' "162 Adams argued that the arbitration provision on his em
ployment application with Circuit City was not binding since it was
a "contract of employment" and he was a worker engaged in inter
state commerce. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed
and held that the arbitration provision, as part of an employment
contract, was excluded from the FAA.t 63
The Supreme Court, however, reversed the Ninth Circuit by
invoking ejusdem generis. The Court held that this general term
which seemingly includes all contracts of employment involving
workers in commerce cannot be read so broadly as to render the
preceding explicit reference to "seamen" and "railroad employees"
pointless. Ultimately, they held that ejusdem generis requires that
"the residual clause should be read to give effect to the terms
'seamen' and 'railroad employees,' and should itself be controlled
and defined by reference to the enumerated categories of workers
which are recited just before it."l64 Therefore, the statute should be
confined to "transportation workers. "165
The "otherwise clause" is a similar general term, since on its
face it lacks specificity and serves as a means for including non
enumerated crimes, following a series of enumerated crimes.
Therefore, under the canon of ejusdem generis, the "otherwise
clause" must be interpreted to include offenses similar in nature
and characteristics to the enumerated crimes.
The common thread among these enumerated crimes is that
they all require an affirmative act that produces a primary harm to
another. Burglary requires the entering or remaining inside a
building of another-essentially the damage of another's property
through the invasion of his building. 166 Arson requires the starting
160. Id. at 109-11.
161. 9 U.S.c. § 1 (2000).
162. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 532 U.S. at 109 (quoting 9 U.S.c. § 1).
163. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 194 F.3d 1070, 1071-72 (9th Cir. 1999)
(citing Craft v. Campbell Soup Co., 17 F.3d 1083, 1094 (9th Cir. 1999)).
164. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 532 U.S. at 115.
165. Id. at 109.
166. Burglary is defined under the prior version of the ACCA as "entering or
remaining surreptitiously within a building that is property of another with the intent to
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of a fire causing the destruction of a building of another. 167 Extor
tion requires any act of either force or coercion to compel another
to act. 168 All of these enumerated crimes have statutory elements
that include an overt act that produces a primary harm to another,
and thus, ejusdem generis requires that the "otherwise clause" in
corporates crimes that have these essential elements: (1) an overt
act that (2) produces a primary harm against another.
The canon of ejusdem generis, however, is not applicable when
it would cause a result conflicting with the intent of Congress. I69
Restricting the "otherwise clause" to crimes that share these two
elements is not to invoke judicial veto over a piece of legislation,
but rather, it attempts to further the intent of the drafters of the
legislation po The requirement of a primary harm to another is
supported by the intent and purpose of the provision, as expressed
through the legislative history of the ACCA. The legislative history
of the ACCA shows that Congress intended to include physically
violent crimes in the first clause, but also intended to include prop
erty crimes. I7l These crimes do not actually result in physical vio
lence, but still create the potential risk of such injury.In
Essentially, the drafters did not want people to escape responsibil
ity for the inherent violence of their actions because of the mere

engage in conduct constituting a Federal or State offense." Taylor v. United States, 495
U.S. 575, 581 (1990) (citing 18 U.S.c. § 1202(c)(9), repealed by Pub. L. No. 99-308,
§ 104(b), 100 Stat. 449, 459 (1986)).
167. A person is guilty of arson under the Model Penal Code § 220.1 "if he starts
a fire or causes an explosion with the purpose of: (a) destroying a building or occupied
structure of another." Model Penal Code § 220.1.
168. Extortion is defined as "[t]he act or practice of obtaining something or com
pelling some action by illegal means, as by force or coercion." BLACK'S LAW DICTION
ARY, supra note 28, at 623.
169. See Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v. Am. Train Dispatchers' Ass'n, 499 U.S.
117, 128-29 (1991) (holding that ejusdem generis "does not control ... when the whole
context dictates a different conclusion"); see also Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124,
128 (1936) ("The rule of ejusdem generis, while firmly established, is only an instrumen
tality for ascertaining the correct meaning of words when there is uncertainty. Ordina
rily, it limits general terms which follow specific ones to matters similar to those
specified; but it may not be used to defeat the obvious purpose of legislation. And,
while penal statutes are narrowly construed, this does not require rejection of that sense
of the words which best harmonizes with the context and the end in view.").
170. ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY, & GARRETI, supra note 157, at 254 (noting that ejus
dem generis "capture[s] our intuitions about legislators' linguistic decisions, namely,
that people use lists to link similar concepts and to illustrate coherent patterns").
171. Supra text accompanying notes 90-99.
172. Id.
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chance that no one was injured. 173 More simply put, an arsonist
should not escape the legal consequences of the violent nature of
setting a building ablaze merely because he lucked out in that no
one was in the building at the time. By considering crimes that
never actually resulted in physical harm to be the same, in degree of
culpability, as those that do result in physical harm, the drafters had
to make some limitations to avoid creating a rule so broad that it
would encompass most criminal acts. If there were no limitations to
the provision, almost all crimes could present a serious potential
risk of injury to another, depending on the particular facts of a
given case.
For example, the crime of driving without a license could pre
sent a serious risk of physical injury to another since the licensing
process ensures that people know how to drive safely. Therefore,
without a license a court may presume that the driver lacks this
knowledge of safe operation of a vehicle, and conclude that the per
son's unsafe driving presents a serious risk of physical injury to an
other. Such broadening of the crime of violence provision would
inevitably conclude that most crimes could be included, which
would, in effect, change the provision from a violent criminal his
tory enhancement to a "general" criminal history enhancement.
This would present a clear problem of redundancy in the Guidelines
since a "general" criminal history enhancement is already provided
for under section 4A1.1.174
Essentially, the intent of the drafters was to treat certain prop
erty crimes that create a serious potential risk of physical violence,
but that do not actually result in physical violence, in a similar man
ner as if the physical violence came to fruition.175 Applying this
analysis to the crime of carrying a concealed weapon, the only con
clusion is that carrying a concealed weapon is not within the scope
of the crime of violence provision. To be convicted of carrying a
concealed weapon, a person must have a weapon "on or about his
person," the weapon must be "hidden from common observation,"
173. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 597 (1990) (finding that "Congress
thought that certain general categories of property crimes-namely burglary, arson, ex
tortion, and the use of explosives-so often presented a risk of injury to persons ... that
they should be included in the enhancement statute even though, considered solely in
terms of their statutory elements, they do not necessarily involve the use or threat of
force against a person").
174. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 3, § 4A1.1; see also
supra text accompanying notes 41-44.
175. See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 597.
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and be "readily accessible" for use. 176 The crime does not require
physical injury to another or damage to another's property. In fact,
since the crime requires "concealment,"177 bystanders do not even
know that a person is carrying such a weapon, and thus, they have
not actually been affected-they are completely oblivious to the
crime. Therefore, under the canon of interpretation ejusdem
generis, the crime of carrying a concealed weapon is excluded from
the crime of violence provision since it is dissimilar to the enumer
ated crimes in the provision by lacking an overt act that produces a
primary harm to another.
In addition to an enumerated list of includable offenses within
the crime of violence provision, the Commentary to the Guidelines
provides for the exclusion of the crime of being a felon in posses
sion of a firearm. While the courts are in disagreement as to
whether the crime of carrying a concealed weapon is similar to un
lawful possession of a firearm by a felon,178 the logic behind exclu
sion of the crime of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon
provides guidance. As Judge Posner stated in United States v.
Lane,179 a felon is "no doubt more likely to make an illegal use of a
firearm than a non-felon," but there is no evidence that the risk of
such use is "substantial."180 Judge Posner illustrated that ex-felons
"have the same motives as lawful possessors of firearms to possess a
firearm-self-defense, hunting, gun collecting, and target prac
tice."181 While the use of a firearm may lead to a crime of violence,
Judge Posner opined that "[a] crime that increases the likelihood of
a crime of violence need not itself be a crime of violence. "182 While
the Eleventh Circuit held that carrying a concealed weapon is dif
ferent from the crime of being a felon in possession due to the fact
that the weapon must be readily accessible,183 the difference is im
material and insignificant to the analysis. The crucial factor is that
includable crimes must have an overt act that produces a primary
harm to another. Neither the crime of carrying a concealed
176. See supra text accompanying notes 116-117.
177. Note the exception of the Massachusetts statute, which does not require con
cealment. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 269, § 10 (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation); see
supra text accompanying note 122.
178. See supra Part I.F (discussing the split among the courts in finding similari
ties and differences between the two crimes).
179. United States v. Lane, 252 F.3d 905 (7th Cir. 2001).
180. Id. at 906.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 907.
183. See United States Hall, 77 F.3d 398, 401-02 (11th Cir. 1996).
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weapon, nor being a felon in unlawful possession of a firearm have,
as an element, an overt act that produces a primary harm to an
other. 184 Judge Posner was pointing to the logical disconnect be
tween what may happen and what has happened, that while
possession of a firearm may lead to violence, no violence has actu
ally occurred. Both crimes, carrying a concealed weapon and un
lawful possession by a felon, share this same trait; the opportunity
for violence is available, but no overt act with a primary harm has
been inflicted upon another. Therefore, while carrying a concealed
weapon is not identical in all aspects, namely the "readily accessi
ble" requirement to the explicitly excluded offense of unlawful pos
session of a firearm by a felon, it does share the necessary
characteristic of lacking an overt act that results in a primary harm
to another. Since neither crime has the determinate characteristic
of an overt act that results in primary harm to another, they are
similar. Therefore, the canon of ejusdem generis provides support
for excluding carrying a concealed weapon from the crime of vio
lence provision, by grouping it with the excluded crime of unlawful
possession of a firearm by a felon.
B.

Carrying a Concealed Weapon is not Conduct that by its
Nature, Presents a Serious Risk of Physical Injury
to Another
1.

Insufficiency of Current Approach by the
Courts of Appeals

In addition to exclusion under ejusdem generis, carrying a con
cealed weapon is beyond the scope of the language of the crime of
violence provision. The "otherwise clause" is limited to crimes
which contain conduct that by its nature presents a serious potential
risk of physical injury to another. 18S This section will argue that
under a proper approach, an objective categorical approach, the
184. See supra text accompanying notes 114-118 (elements of carrying a con
cealed weapon). The crime of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon restricts any
person
who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment
for a term exceeding one year ... to ship or transport in interstate or foreign
commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or
to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported
in interstate or foreign commerce.
18 V.S.c. § 922(g) (2000).
185. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 3, § 4B1.2(a)(2) cmt.
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crime of carrying a concealed weapon does not include conduct that
by its nature presents a serious risk of physical injury to another.
The circuits are split regarding the inclusion of the crime of
carrying a concealed weapon in the crime of violence provision, es
sentially due to the approach the courts utilize in answering the
question. Assuming that a court could interpret carrying a con
cealed weapon as a crime that fits within the general category of
crimes included in the provision, a sentencing court must further
determine whether the conduct of carrying a concealed weapon
presents a "serious potential risk of physical injury to another."186
The discrepancy between the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits re
sults from the subjective determination of whether the crime of car
rying a concealed weapon presents enough "potential risk" of
"serious physical injury" to fall within the scope of the provision.
Since the Guidelines were created to correct disparity of sentenc
ing, any interpretation, including a sUbjective categorical approach,
of a provision of the Guidelines that opens the possibility of dispar
ity among the courts must necessarily fail. Sentencing criminals in
accordance with an objective standard was a fundamental purpose
and principle of the Guidelines. The Sentencing Commission cre
ated an objective valuation standard in sentencing, where a defen
dant's sentence is merely calculated by adding up the point values
the Guidelines assign to a particular circumstance of consideration
instead of leaving a large amount of room for judicial interpreta
tion. This general approach strongly suggests that the Guidelines
were created to efficiently employ a mechanical valuation system
and remove any broad, ambiguous language that would allow sub
jective determinations. In addressing the proper approach to the
Guidelines, the Supreme Court in Taylor v. United States attempted
to restrict subjective determinations by implementing the formal
categorical approach.
The formal categorical approach of Taylor restricts the sen
tencing court's analysis to the generic definition of a crime, and
rests upon the notion that the language and intent behind the crime
of violence provision was to normalize the application of the provi
sion across the country. In Taylor, the inclusion of "burglary" was
at issue, and although explicitly included in the provision, the crime
of burglary, a state law crime, is defined in a variety of ways by the
states. 187 For example, Michigan "has no offense formally labeled
186.
187.

[d. § 4B1.2(a)(2).
Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 591 (1990).
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burglary," but rather classifies the conduct in "grades of 'breaking
and entering.' "188 Therefore, a sentencing court in Michigan may
look only at Michigan law in determining whether the defendant's
prior conviction for "breaking and entering" is within the scope of
the crime of violence provision. In so doing, it is possible to con
clude that it is not within the scope of the provision since it is not
labeled "burglary." To resolve this problem, the Supreme Court
held that the language and the intent of the drafters in drafting the
provision was that the focus should be on the "conduct" of the
crime, no matter how a particular state labels such conduct in its
criminal code. 189
The holding in Taylor, however, is insufficient in addressing the
issue of whether carrying a concealed weapon is a crime of violence,
since the Taylor court dealt with an enumerated crime. Ascertain
ing the proper definition is conclusive in cases in which an enumer
ated offense of the provision is at issue since the sole question, as in
Taylor, is whether the defendant committed a crime listed in the
provision. The "otherwise clause" requires a secondary analysis af
ter determining the generic definition of the prior offense commit
ted by the defendant: whether the conduct of the offense "presents
a serious risk of potential physical injury to another." Applying the
same rationale to this clause of the provision, as the Supreme Court
did in Taylor to ascertain the definition of the crime, the issue is
resolved-expand an objective standard to the determination of
whether the conduct presents a serious potential risk of physical
injury to another.
2.

An Objective Categorical Approach to Analyzing the
Crime of Violence Provision

An objective categorical approach to defining the crime of car
rying a concealed weapon incorporates not only the crime's general
statutory elements, but also its generic characteristics, including
how the states punish and how they have evaluated the risk created
by the conduct. 190 Under an objective categorical approach, the
188. Id. (quoting MICH. COMPo LAWS § 750.110 (1979».
189. Id. at 592 ("We think that 'burglary' in § 924(e) must have some uniform
definition independent of the labels employed by the various States' criminal codes.").
190. See also United States V. Custis, 988 F.2d 1355, 1363 (4th Cir. 1993). The
Fourth Circuit held that in applying the categorical approach of Taylor, "courts must
necessarily make common-sense judgments about whether a given offense proscribes
generic conduct with the potential for serious physical injury to another." /d. (emphasis
added). Both the common sense approach and the objective categorical approach, pro
posed in this Note, attempt to accomplish the same objective-to establish a method for
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crime of carrying a concealed weapon is excluded since the states
have illustrated that it is not the conduct of the crime, but rather,
characteristics of the defendant that make the crime present a seri
ous potential risk of physical injury to another.
All states allow people to carry a concealed weapon.l 91 In fact,
both Vermont and Alaska have no affirmative requirements for its
citizens to be able to carry a concealed weapon. 192 The other states
allow people to carry a concealed weapon provided that they apply
for and receive a permit from the state to do so. The permitting
exception (as well as Vermont and Alaska) illustrates two impor
tant issues in determining whether the crime of carrying a con
cealed weapon is included in the crime of violence provision: (1) it
clarifies and defines the conduct, and (2) it is an excellent measure
of how the states weigh the risk of that conduct.
As Part I.E indicates, the general purpose of criminalizing car
rying a concealed weapon is that people can be suddenly angered,
and if an angered person has a hidden weapon, they may be able to
employ it with unfair surprise against another. Superficially, this
seems to fit exactly within the definition of a crime of violence
carrying a concealed weapon has the potential risk ofphysical injury
to another. However, since States allow certain people (those with
permits) to carry a concealed weapon, one cannot logically con
clude that the states are giving people the opportunity to put others
at a potential risk of injury. The States are emphatically declaring
that it is not the conduct that creates the risk, but rather, the person
that creates the risk. The permitting process is an official determi
nation by the state that the person is a risk or is not a risk. If a
person is granted a permit, he is not a risk, and by carrying a con
cealed weapon his conduct, likewise, does not present such risk of
injury to another. In contrast, if a person is denied a permit, the
state has determined that he is a risk, and thus, by carrying a con
cealed weapon, he is creating a risk of injury to another.1 93
analysis that provides a consistent interpretation of the crime of violence provision
among the federal courts.
191. Only thirteen states are at issue in this Note since the provision provides a
term of imprisonment restriction, which applies only to thirteen states. See supra text
accompanying notes 127-128.
192. ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.220 (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4003 (West, Westlaw through 2005 legislation).
193. The assertion that the State has made a formal determination that a person
is a risk (i.e., he was denied a permit for carrying a concealed weapon and thus by
carrying he is creating a risk to another) does not undermine the analysis of the provi
sion in this Note. To the contrary, it directly supports one of the principles upon which
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Since the crime of violence provision requires the conduct to
be the risk creating factor, carrying a concealed weapon is not
within the scope of the provision. Furthermore, since being con
victed of the crime of carrying a concealed weapon necessarily re
quires absence of a permit, for a court to determine that it is a
crime of violence it must presume that absence of a permit is con
clusive evidence that the person is one that the state has deter
mined is a risk.
C.

Absence of a Permit to Carry a Concealed Cannot Be
Conclusive Evidence that Such Person is a Risk

Lacking a permit to carry a concealed weapon cannot be con
clusive evidence in deciding that the person is a risk, for such deter
mination makes an illogical leap that will fail in actual application
by including persons who are not a risk.
A hypothetical is necessary to illustrate this point. Suppose de
fendant A applies for a permit on January 1, 2006, because she is in
fear of her life and safety from an abusive husband. The permitting
process takes time to complete. Since A is in immediate danger,
she cannot wait, and thus begins carrying a concealed weapon on
January 1, 2006. Defendant A is pulled over on a typical traffic stop
for speeding, and while searching for her driver's license, the police
officer sees the handle of a pistol in her purse. Because defendant
A lacks a permit, the police officer arrests her for carrying a con
cealed weapon.
Was defendant A, by carrying a concealed weapon, creating a
serious risk of physical injury to another? As previously stated, the
determination of being a risk under state law stems from the per
mitting process. However, unlike a situation in which a person was
granted a permit (determined by the state not to be a risk) or de
nied a permit (determined by the state to be a risk), defendant A is
in a gray area-she has had no formal official determination of risk
by the state.
The ultimate answer as to whether defendant A was a risk, and
thereby her conduct was a risk, lies in whether she could have ob
tained a permit at the time she was arrested for the crime. If she
would have been denied a permit, the State would view her as a
this argument rests, that any risk in carrying a concealed weapon is determined not by
the act, but by the actor. Since the provision requires an analysis of the conduct, such
conclusion that the actor creates the risk clearly takes this crime out of the intended
scope of the provision.
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risk, and by carrying a concealed weapon her conduct would have
created a risk of harm. On the other hand the opposite is also true;
if defendant A would have been able to receive a permit, by her
nature she was not a risk when she was carrying the concealed
weapon, and thus, her conduct is not a risk either. 194
In order to properly conclude that carrying a concealed
weapon presents a serious potential risk of injury to another, the
court must determine the particular characteristic of the defen
dant-namely whether the defendant could have obtained a permit.
This would be a fact-finding based approach to interpreting the
crime of violence provision, and would be able to resolve any dis
crepancies. However, the Supreme Court has emphatically refused
to allow such an approach on two grounds; first, a fact-finding
based approach is not authorized by the Guidelines, and second,
the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial also pre
cludes the judge from making factual determinations that were not
submitted to the jury.1 95 Instead, courts are limited to a categorical
approach and must only look at the elements of the crime.1 96 Since
the crime of carrying a concealed weapon makes no mention of
whether the defendant was within the class of "risky persons" (una
ble to obtain a permit), under the proper approach to the Guide
lines-the objective categorical approach-a court could never
conclude that the act of carrying a concealed weapon is a crime of
violence.
CONCLUSION

While the structure of criminal sentencing has evolved and
changed during the life of our nation, criminal law and sentencing
has been and always will remain the prerogative of the people.
Criminal law is society'S collective manner of governing ourselves,
for there is no greater expression of our will than that which dic
tates permissible and impermissible conduct. Furthermore, crirni
194. This argument is not intended to suggest that if one could have received a
permit he should not face criminal liability. The argument is only limited to determin
ing whether. when the act was committed, the person was a "risk," as defined by the
state permitting laws. It should be noted, however, that Pennsylvania does extend this
logic also to the criminal liability for the conduct itself. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 6106(a)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation) provides that a person who car
ries a concealed weapon without a valid permit commits a felony in the third degree;
however, clause (2) reduces the crime to a misdemeanor in the first degree for persons
who would have been eligible to obtain a valid license.
195. See supra text accompanying notes 100-108.
196. Id.
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nal sentencing is a measure of what laws we deem most important,
and what conduct we deem most urgent to punish, deter, and reha
bilitate. As it stands today, the structure of criminal sentencing is
uncertain with the introduction of the Booker holding, rendering
the Guidelines advisory. However, since courts still must consult
the Guidelines in determining the proper sentencing range, the in
terpretation of the particular sections of the Guidelines remains im
portant. Because of this, any interpretation of a clause in the
Guidelines must be true to the Guidelines in both language and
purpose.
It is for these reasons that the crime of carrying a concealed
weapon is excluded from the scope of a crime of violence on multi
ple grounds. First, the crime is dissimilar in character to those enu
merated crimes in the statute and the commentary, and thus the
canon of statutory interpretation, ejusdem generis, excludes it from
the provision. Additionally, the crime of carrying a concealed
weapon is also excluded from the provision after applying the
proper approach to the provision. By expanding the holding in Tay
lor, a formal categorical approach, to adequately handle cases of
crimes that are not enumerated, a sentencing court is left with an
objective categorical approach. This approach forces a sentencing
court to take a generic, objective view toward the risk evaluation
process, in addition to the established generic approach to the defi
nition of the crime as suggested by the Taylor Court. By objectively
adopting the risk evaluation that the states have already made, a
sentencing court is provided clear guidance; the conduct of carrying
a concealed weapon, by its nature, does not present a serious poten
tial risk of physical injury to another, and therefore is not a "crime
of violence."
Neal Eriksen
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ApPENDIX A
MAXIMUM IMPRISONMENT TERMS FOR
CARRYING A CONCEALED WEAPON

Lawful to Carry a Concealed Weapon:197
Alaska, Vermont

30 Days:198
North Carolina, Oklahoma
90 Days:199

South Carolina, Washington
6 Months: 2OO

Alabama, Arizona, Idaho, Louisiana, Mississippi, Montana,
New Mexico, Ohio, Oregon, Wyoming

One year:201
Arkansas, California, Colorado, District of Columbia, Georgia,
Hawaii, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Minnesota, Nebraska,
197. ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.220 (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4003 (West, Westlaw through 2005 legislation).
198. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 1272 (prohibition), 1276 (punishment) (West,
Westlaw through 2006 legislation); N.C GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-269 (prohibition), 15A
1340.23(c) (punishment) (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation).
199. S.C CODE ANN. § 16-23-460 (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9.41.050 (prohibition), 9.92.030 (punishment) (West,
West law through 2007 legislation);
200. ALA. CODE § 13A-11-50 (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-3102 (prohibition), 13-707(A)(I) (punishment) (West, Westlaw
through 2006 legislation); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 18-3302 (prohibition), 18-113 (punish
ment) (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-8-104 (West,
Westlaw through 2006 legislation); MISS. CODE ANN. § 91-37-1 (West, Westlaw through
2006 legislation); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-316 (West, Westlaw through 2005 legisla
tion); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-7-2 (prohibition), 31-19-1(L) (punishment) (West,
Westlaw through 2006 legislation); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2923.12 (prohibition),
2929.24(A)(I) (punishment) (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation); OR. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 166.240(1) (prohibition), 161.615(2) (punishment) (West, Westlaw through
2005 legislation); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:95 (West, Westlaw through 2006
legislation ).
201. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-73-120 (prohibition), 5-4-401(b)(I) (punishment)
(West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation); CAL. PENAL CODE § 12025 (West, Westlaw
through 2007 legislation); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 18-12-105 (prohibition), 18-1.3
501 (punishment) (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation); D.C CODE §§ 22-4504
(prohibition), 22-4515 (punishment) (West, Westlaw through 2007 legislation); GA.
CODE ANN. §§ 16-11-126 (prohibition), 17-10-3 (punishment) (West, Westlaw through
2006 legislation); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 134-51 (prohibition), 701-107 (punishment)
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Nevada, New Hampshire, North Dakota, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Texas, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin

Exceeding One Year: 202
Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Maryland, Mas
sachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Penn
sylvania, Rhode Island

(West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-47-2-1(a) (prohibi
tion), 35-50-3-2 (punishment) (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation); KAN. CRIM.
CODE. ANN. §§ 21-4201(a)(i) (prohibition), 21-4502(a) (punishment) (West, Westlaw
through 2006 legislation); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 527.020(1)(9) (prohibition),
532.090(1) (punishment) (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 25, §§ 2001-A, 2004 (prohibition), tit. 17-A, § 1252(2)(D) (punishment) (West,
Westlaw through 2006 legislation); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 624.714(1)(a) (prohibition),
609.03(2) (punishment) (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation); NEB. REV. STAT.
§§ 28-1202(1)(2)(3) (prohibition), 28-106 (punishment) (West, Westlaw through 2006
legislation); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 202.350(1)(d)(1)-(4), (2)(a)(I) (prohibition),
193.140 (punishment) (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 159:4 (prohibition), 625:9(IV)(a)(I) (punishment) (West, Westlaw through 2006 leg
islation); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 62.1-04-01, 62.1-04-05 (prohibition), 12.1-32-01(5) (pun
ishment) (West, Westlaw through 2005 legislation); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-14
9(1)(2) (prohibition), 22-6-2(1) (punishment) (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation);
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-17-1307(a)(I)(2) (prohibition), 39-11-110 (punishment) (West,
Westlaw through 2006 legislation); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 46.02(a)-(b) (prohibi
tion), 12.21(2) (punishment) (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation); UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 76-10-504(1) (prohibition), 76-3-204(1)-(2) (punishment) (West, Westlaw
through 2006 legislation); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-308(A)(i)-(iv) (prohibition), 18.2
l1(a) (punishment) (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61
7-3(a) (West, Westlaw through 2007 legislation); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 941.23 (prohibi
tion), 939.51(3)(a) (punishment) (West, Westlaw through 2005 legislation) (nine
months).
202. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-206(a) (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 1442 (prohibition), 4205(b)(7) (punishment) (West,
Westlaw through 2007 legislation); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 790.01(1)-(3) (prohibition),
775.082 (punishment) (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation); 720 ILL. COMPo STAT.
ANN. 5/24-1.6(a), (d) (prohibition), 730 ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 5/5-8-1(a)(7) (punish
ment) (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 724.4(1) (prohi
bition), 903.1(2) (punishment) (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation); MD. CODE
ANN., CRIM. LAW § 4-101 (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ch. 269, § 10 (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation); MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN.
§§ 750.227(2)-(3) (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§§ 571.030(1)(5) (prohibition), 558.011(1)(4) (punishment) (West, Westlaw through
2006 legislation); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:39-5(b) (prohibition), 2C:43-6(a)(3) (punish
ment) (West, Westlaw through 2006 legislation); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 265.02(6) (prohi
bition), 70.00(2)(d) (punishment) (West, Westlaw through 2007 legislation); 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 6106(a)(I) (prohibition), 1103(3), 1104(1) (punishment) (West,
Westlaw through 2006 legislation); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-47-8(a) (West, Westlaw
through 2006 legislation).
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SENTENCING TABLE 203

Criminal History Category (Criminal History Points)
V
VI
Offense I
(10, 11, (13 or
U
m
IV
Level
(0 or 1) (2 or 3) (4, 5, 6) (7,8, 9) 12)
more)
0-6
0-6
0-6
0-6
0-6
0-6
Zone A 1
2
0-6
0-6
0-6
1-7
0-6
0-6
3
0-6
0-6
2-8
3-9
0-6
0-6
6-12
4
0-6
0-6
0-6
2-8
4-10
6-12
9-15
5
0-6
0-6
1-7
4-10
6-12
9-15
12-18
6
0-6
1-7
2-8
7
0-6
2-8
4-10
8-14
12-18
15-21
18-24
8
0-6
4-10
6-12
10-16
15-21
Zone B 9
4-10
6-12
8-14
12-18
18-24
21-27
21-27
24-30
10
6-12
8-14
10-16
15-21
Zone C 11
8-14
10-16
12-18
18-24
24-30
27-33
10-16
12-18
21-27
27-33
30-37
12
15-21
Zone D 13
12-18
15-21
18-24
24-30
30-37
33-41
14
15-21
18-24
21-27
27-33
33-41
37-46
18-24
21-27
37-46
41-51
15
24-30
30-37
16
21-27
24-30
27-33
33-41
41-51
46-57
24-30
51-63
17
27-33
30-37
37-46
46-57
57-71
18
27-33
30-37
33-41
41-51
51-63
63-78
19
30-37
33-41
37-46
46-57
57-71
20
33-41
37-46
41-51
51-63
63-78
70-87
37-46
41-51
77-96
21
46-57
57-71
70-87
22
41-51
46-57
51-63
63-78
77-96
84-105
23
46-57
51-63
57-71
70-87
84-105
92-115
24
51-63
57-71
63-78
77-96
92-115
100-125
25
57-71
63-78
70-87
84-105
100-125 110-137
63-78
92-115
26
70-87
78-97
110-137 120-150
27
70-87
78-97
87-108
100-125 120-150 130-162
110-137 130-162 140-175
28
78-97
87-108
97-121
29
87-108
97-121
108-135 121-151 140-175 151-188
30
97-121
108-135 121-151 135-168 151-188 168-210
31
108-135 121-151 135-168 151-188 168-210 188-235
32
121-151 135-168 151-188 168-210 188-235 210-262
135-168 151-188 168-210 188-235 210-262 235-293
33
151-188 168-210 188-235 210-262 235-293 262-327
34
168-210 188-235 210-262 235-293 262-327 292-365
35
36
188-235 210-262 235-293 262-327 292-365 324-405
37
210-262 235-293 262-327 292-365 324-405 360-life
38
235-293 262-327 292-365 324-405 360-life 360-life
262-327 292-365 324-405 360-life 360-life 360-life
39
292-365 324-405 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life
40
324-405 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life
41
42
360-life
360-life 360-life 360-life 360-life
360-life
life
life
life
43
life
life
life
203.

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL,

supra note 3, sentencing table.

